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Damages for Wrongful Birth
and Wrongful Pregnancy in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

In one case, a parent sues a doctor, seeking damages for childbirth and child-rearing expenses after the doctor fails to provide
adequate genetic testing and a handicapped child is born. 1 In
another case, parents accuse a doctor of saddling them with a
healthy but unplanned baby after the doctor negligently performs a sterilization operation. 2 These scenarios typify the causes
of action which have been labeled, respectively, wrongful birth
3
and wrongful pregnancy.
In a wrongful birth action, 4 the parent alleges injury in the
form of the birth of a child with a serious disease or handicap

1. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama
law).
2. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir 1983).
3. Although some courts and commentators have distinguished wrongful birth from
wrongful pregnancy, the Illinois Supreme Court in Cockrun v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d
193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), did not make such a distinction, instead using the terms
disjunctively. The court did limit its decision, however, to the denial of the costs of rearing a healthy child (the "wrongful pregnancy"), implicitly suggesting that the birth of an
unhealthy child (the "wrongful birth") might yield a different result. Id. at 195, 447
N.E.2d at 386. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
4. The term "wrongful birth" has been used broadly to describe any tort related to
birth. See, e.g., Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 428 A.2d 1366, 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981),
vacated, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982) (Hester, J., concurring and dissenting):
"[A]lthough this [suit] may more appropriately be labelled as one for wrongful conception,. . . or even wrongful pregnancy ...I will retain, for convenience, the wrongful birth
nomenclature." 428 A.2d at 1378 (Hester, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). The Mason case involved an unsuccessful tubal ligation, and thus the more precise
name for the cause of action would have been wrongful pregnancy. See infra notes 5, 6.
One court has noted that a "clear delineation of certain terminological distinctions is
essential to a proper understanding of the theoretical issues raised by plaintiffs' claims."
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1983). The Phillips court added:
"[Tjhis court feels that these distinctions are essential to the development of an analytic
framework. Perhaps the most compelling justification for this terminology is provided by
those jurisdictions that recognize "wrongful birth" claims but not "wrongful pregnancy"
claims. Id. For further discussion of terminological problems, see generally Comment,
Damages for the Wrongful Birth of Healthy Babies, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 605 (1983).
Rather than terminological distinctions, problems in these new tort causes of action lie
in the analyses used by the courts to determine liability and damages. Failure to distin-
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resulting from negligently performed or omitted genetic counseling or prenatal testing.5 With the proper medical information,
the parent would most likely have aborted the fetus. In a wrongful pregnancy action, injury to the parent usually results from a
negligently performed abortion, sterilization, or contraceptive

guish wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy analyses, regardless of terms, has resulted
in confusing, inconsistent, and arbitrary decisions. See generally Taub, Wrongful Life: Its
Problems are Not Just Semantic: A Reply to Furrow, LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE,Oct.
1982, at 208 (designating wrongful life cause of action as "X" to avoid semantical
problems).
5. See generally Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to be Born, 54 TuL L. REV.
480 (1980). The child's corresponding action is a wrongful life suit. See infra note 8. A
"wrongful birth" case is quite distinct from a "wrongful pregnancy" case, although both
actions are brought by the parents. A parent bringing a wrongful birth cause of action
says, in effect, to the defendant, "Perhaps I wished to conceive this child. But you committed a wrong by failing to run tests or provide information about the condition of the
fetus. I would not have allowed the birth to take place if you had told me the child would
suffer from these severe handicaps." See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 558 F.2d 471 (7th
Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law) (child born with Rubella syndrome); Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (child born with Tay
Sachs disease); DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (father
given separate cause of action); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(child born with Larsen's Syndrome); Anderson v. Wagner, 61 Ill.
App. 3d 822,378 N.E.2d
805 (1978) (child born with Rubella Syndrome); Goldberg v. Ruskin, Nos. 81-1450, 81-1962
(Ill. App. Ct. argued Feb. 16, Mar. 23, 1983) (wrongful birth and wrongful life counts
pending at appellate court level; child born with Tay Sachs disease); Eisenbrenner v.
Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981) (child born with Rubella Syndrome);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (child born with Down's Syndrome);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (child born with Rubella Syndrome); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 486 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807,411 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (child born with Down's Syndrome); Park v.
Chessen, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1977) (child born with polycystic kidney disease), modified sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 47 N.Y.2d 401, 486 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978) (child born with Down's Syndrome); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 53 A.D.2d 523,
384 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977)
(child born with Down's Syndrome); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (child born with Tay Sachs disease); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d
73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (deformed child born notwithstanding risks of mother's age,
thyroid condition, and previous birth of deformed child); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 A.D.2d
765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975) (mem.) (child born with Down's Syndrome); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35
A.D.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (child born with Rubella Syndrome); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (child born with Rubella Syndrome); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460,656 P.2d 483 (1983) (children born with "fetal hydantoin syndrome"); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975)
(child born with Rubella Syndrome). See also Annot., 83 A.LR.3d 15 (1978). For two
excellent discussions of the issues involved in the wrongful birth cause of action, see generally Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling,79 CoLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979); Rogers,
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpracticein Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713 (1982).

19841

Wrongful Birth/Pregnancy

procedure.6 The parents' alleged injury is the unwanted pregnancy and subsequent arrival of an unplanned, although usually healthy child.7 Both wrongful birth and wrongful preg-

6. An action for wrongful pregnancy is generally brought by the parents of a healthy
but unplanned child against a pharmacist for negligently filling a contraceptive prescription or against a physician for negligently performing a sterilization procedure or an
abortion. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp at 545 n.1. A parent bringing a "wrongful
pregnancy" cause of action says, in effect, to the defendant, "I never wished to conceive
or remain pregnant with this child. You committed a wrong by negligently performing
my sterilization operation or abortion. I would not have allowed the pregnancy to take
place if you had told me that I was unprotected and thus capable of becoming pregnant,
or that you had failed to terminate this pregnancy." See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707
F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (unsuccessful tubal cauterization); Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.
Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (negligent sterilization); University of Ariz. Health Sciences
Center v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579,667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Stills
v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (unsuccessful abortion); Custodio
v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303,59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (unsuccessful tubal ligation); Ochs
v. Borelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 83 (1982) (negligent sterilization); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (negligent tubal ligation); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (negligent tubal ligation); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388
So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (unsuccessful tubal ligation); Jackson v. Anderson,
230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (negligent sterilization); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981), rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385,
cert. denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983) (unsuccessful
vasectomy); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51,391 N.E.2d 479 (1979) (negligently
performed abortion); Pierce v. DeGracia, 103 111. App. 3d 511, 431 N.E.2d 768 (1982) (negligently performed vasectomy); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971)
(pharmacist negligently substituted tranquilizer for birth control pills); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Christensen v.
Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (negligently performed tubal ligation);
Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Ziemba v.
Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (tubal ligation unsuccessful); Bowman
v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 596 (1976) (negligently performed tubal ligation);
Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lycoming Rep. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W,2d 124 (Tex. 1973) (unsuccessful sterilization operation), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (unsuccessful vasectomy);
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (failure to diagnose
plaintiffs pregnancy); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1982) (negligently performed sterilization). See generally Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy,33 S.C.L. REv. 759 (1982);
Comment, supra note 4; Annot., A.L.R3d 15 (1978).
7. It is important to note that there can be some overlap between wrongful birth and
wrongful pregnancy: "For example, a few 'wrongful pregnancy' cases involve unplanned
children who, coincidentally, were born with congenital defects." Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1983) (citing La Point v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118
(W.D. Tex. 1976)). See also Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (after
a negligently performed sterilization, plaintiff gave birth to twins, one healthy, and one
with a congential abnormality); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1976)
(plaintiff gave birth to a handicapped child after an unsuccessful vasectomy on her husband and a subsequent unsuccessful abortion). The "overlap" theory may be unnecessarily confusing. Like any wrongful pregnancy case, the injury still arises when the
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nancy claims should be distinguished from a wrongful life cause

unplanned conception occurs. If a state limits wrongful pregnancy damages to pregnancy- an.d,birth-related expenses, the coincidental handicap should not change this
limitation. In other cases, overlap was found to have occurred in cases involving children born
with foreseeable handicapped conditions. The parents in these cases had sought sterilization, contraception, or abortion for eugenic reasons. See, e.g., Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d
412 (Tex. 1973) (doctor's negligent performance of a vasectomy on the plaintiff resulted in
the birth of a deformed child who lived for only nine months; the parents had sought
sterilization after giving birth to two retarded children). Accord Ochs v. Borreli, 187
Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982) (prior births of two children born with orthopedic defects
caused parents to seek sterilization for eugenic reasons). In these types of cases, the fact
that a parent seeks sterilization in order to avoid the danger of a genetic defect may
cause confusion between the typical wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth suits. One
court noted that, in such cases, the benefits offset rule, infra note 39, would be helpful in
that "the jury could easily find that the uneventful birth of a healthy, non-defective child
was a blessing rather than a 'damage.' " University of Ariz. v. Health Sciences Center v.
Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 585, 667 P.2d 1294, 1300 (1983). Another case of this type
invoking the benefits offset rule was Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496
(1979). In this case, an infant was born with neurofibromatosis, a crippling disease of the
nervous system, after both an unsuccessful vasectomy and an unsuccessful abortion. The
sterilization and abortion attempts were sought specifically because the parents feared
the child would be born with the hereditary disease from which the father and the child's
two sisters also suffered. The court treated the case as a wrongful pregnancy claim and
allowed full damages, with a benefits offset, for the care and treatment of the child. Id. at
353, 408 A.2d at 509. Later, in Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d
1366 (1981), vacated, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982), the same court refused to recognize
a distinction between handicapped and healthy children. Evidently the court was confused as to whether any real distinction existed between the wrongful pregnancy and
wrongful birth causes of action. After noting that Texas and Wisconsin made such a
distinction, the Mason court held, "In light of Speck a distinction similar to that made by
the [Wisconsin] court is not possible." 428 A.2d at 1370.
The foreseeable handicap in these cases may affect damages significantly in some
jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions where damages in wrongful pregnancy cases are usually limited to pregnancy and birth-related expenses, the foreseeable handicap might not
change the award at all. The injury is deemed to be the conception. Reasons for avoiding
that conception should not be considered when the conception results in a handicapped
child. But see Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), affd, 450 So.
2d 822 (Fla.1984). In Ramey, a wrongful pregnancy case, a handicapped child was born
after an unsuccessful vasectomy. After a subsequent negligently performed sperm count,
a healthy child was born. The court denied normal rearing costs for both children, but
allowed medical expenses for the handicapped child because of the potentially staggering
expenses.
Courts using this limited damages rule should not consider reasons for avoiding the
conception when the child turns out healthy, e.g., whether the parents were poverty
stricken with ten hungry children at home, or whether the parents had one child and
wished to pursue professional careers. But see Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), which held that "a fact finder should place great weight on a couple's reason
for undergoing sterilization in deciding whether the subsequent birth of a [healthy] child,
on balance, constitutes damage to the parents." Id. at 1555. When a jurisdiction uses the
benefits offset rule in determining wrongful pregnancy damages, the foreseeable handi-
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of action, which is brought by the child, not the parents. 8
Courts and commentators have used the terms wrongful birth
and wrongful pregnancy interchangeably. More important than
terminology, however, is the confusion engendered when courts
fail to distinguish their analyses of the tort issues involved in
cap can have a considerable effect. The jury can award full damages for child rearing,
which will include tremendous medical expenses, and then subtract the benefits, which
might be considerably less with a severely handicapped child.
8. A wrongful life case is always brought by the child, never by the parents. In a
wrongful life case, it is the child who 91'aims that, but for the defendant's negligence, the
child would not have been born. The factual situation underlying wrongful life suits fall
into the same two general categories as wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy: plaintiffs handicapped at birth, and the plaintiffs healthy throughout the pregnancy and
birth. The distinguishing characteristic of a wrongful life suit is not the underlying facts,
but rather the party claiming relief. When the child requests relief, the court is confronted
with a philosophical dilemma not present when the child's parents bring suit. Placing the
plaintiff child in the position he was prior to the tortious act usually means that the child
would no longer exist. For this reason, few courts have been willing to recognize a cause
of action for wrongful life. See Note, A Preferencefor Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a
Proposed Tort for Genetic Malpractice,55 S.C.L. REv. 477 (1982). A full discussion of this
cause of action is beyond the scope of this note.
For court decisions and commentaries discussing wrongful life cases, see generally
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1983) (Down's Syndrome); Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Tay Sachs); La Point v.
Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (unsuccessful tubal ligation); Smith v. United
States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (Rubella Syndrome); Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d
546 (Ala. 1978) (unsuccessful vasectomy); Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1981), rev'd, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (hereditary
deafness); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980) (Tay Sachs) (California and Washington stand alone in recognizing the wrongful
life cause of action); DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357,308 N.W.2d 209 (1981) (Rubella Syndrome);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan,
80 N.J. 421, 404, A.2d 8 (1979) (Down's Syndrome); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587,400
N.Y.S.2d 119, modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 411 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (Down's
Syndrome); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, modified sub nom. Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (polycystic kidney disease); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977)
(Down's Syndrome); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73,394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (deformed
child); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975) (mem.) (Down's Syndrome); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, modified,
35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (Rubella Syndrome); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d
496 (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (neurofibromatosis);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (Rubella Syndrome); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (birth defects caused by prenatal use of
anti-convulsant drugs); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975 (Rubella Syndrome). See generally Cohen, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of Wrongful Life, 4 Am. J.L & MED. 211 (1979); Persky,
Wrongful Life: The Dawning of a New Cause of Action in Illinois?, 71 ILL B.J. 594 (1983);
Annot., A.L.1R3d 15 (1978).
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wrongful pregnancy cases from those arising in wrongful birth
actions. 9 Nowhere is the confusion between wrongful pregnancy
and wrongful birth more evident, or the consequences more
serious, than in the awarding of damages. 10 Damages awarded
under both causes of action vary greatly, ranging from the minimal costs of the birth itself, to full damages, including the cost
of raising the child."
The urgency of this problem is underscored by the rapid
growth in litigation in this area of law.1 2 In little more than five
years, twenty-six jurisdictions have faced claims of wrongful
pregnancy, wrongful birth, or both. Of those courts that have faced
both, three have not distinguished wrongful pregnancy from
wrongful birth in their analyses, 3 while four have made such a

9. Typical tort issues include: allocation of risk and injury so as not to unduly burden
the tortfeasor in proportion to his wrongdoing; application of public policies which might
limit the award; and measurement of each damage element to avoid speculative, arbitrary, or inconsistent awards. See generally Moore, Wrongful Birth- The Problems of
Damages Computation,28 U. Mo. K.C.L 1 (1979).
10. See generally Tortzig, The Defective Child and Actions for Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. 15, 18 (1970); Comment, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and
Mishandling by JudicialFiat, 13 VAL U.L. REV. 127 (1978).
11. Most courts agree that the plaintiffs award should include standard elements of
damages, at least up to a point. Thus, a court might award damages for the unsuccessful
operation, pain and suffering, medical costs of the pregnancy and birth, lost wages, and
loss of consortium, if applicable. There is sharp disagreement, however, as to whether
plaintiffs may recover damages for the costs of rearing the child. Compare Cockrum, 99
Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981) (awarding full damages, including rearing costs)
with Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979) (awarding childbirth expenses only). See also Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for Bringing Up
Baby?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 418 (1978); Note, Recovery of Child Support for Wrongful
Birth, 47 TUL L. REV. 225 (1972). Under the standard damages rule, the element of childrearing costs would logically be included, since the parents would not have incurred those
costs but for the tortfeasor's act.
12. Statistics show that 178,000 tubal ligations were performed in 1971, which number
increased to 670,000 in 1978. Appleson, Wrongful Birth Suits on the Rise, 67 A.B.A. J.
1255 (1981). See also infra note 15.
13. The only three states which do not distinguish between wrongful birth and
wrongful pregnancy are:
New Jersey: "We see no difference between a so-called 'wrongful birth' action ... and
the so-called 'wrongful pregnancy' action ....
P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 470,
432 A.2d 556, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). The New Jersey Supreme Court
declined to either approve or disapprove Portadin in Schroeder v. Pelkel, 87 N.J. 53, 69
n.2, 432 A.2d 834, 842 n.2 (1981). It might, however, have approved the lower court's "no
distinction" approach: "Procedural protections and penalties do not vary according to the
presence or absence of physical deformities in the victim or defendant. It is life itself that
is jealousy safeguarded, not life in a perfect state." Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429-30,
404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979). In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a wrongful birth
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distinction. 14 Those sixteen jurisdictions which have considered
one, but not both, of these causes of action, and others which will
be forced to confront the issue in the near future, must decide
whether to distinguish wrongful birth from wrongful pregnancy

case, used wrongful pregnancy cases to "highlight the problem of assessing damages in
wrongful conception [pregnancy], wrongful birth and wrongful life cases," evidently
making no distinction between the types of damages problems each cause of action
involves. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. at 69 n.2, 432 A.2d at 841 n.2.
Pennsylvania: "A distinction similar to that made by the Dumer [Wisconsin] court is
not possible ....[Wie find no basis for distinguishing the 'wrongful but healthy life'....
from [the handicapped life]." Mason v. Western Pa.Hosp., 428 A.2d 1366, 1370 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981), vacated, 499 Pa. 478, 453 A.2d 974 (1982). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did
not address the distinction. It split 5-2 on awarding pregnancy and birth related
expenses, and split 4-3 on denying emotional and financial costs of raising the child. 499
Pa. at 480, 453 A.2d at 976. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has twice indicated that it
would simply use standard tort analysis in either cause of action: Mason, id. at 479, 453
A.2d at 975 (plaintiff is entitled "to relief under basic principles of the law of... tort.");
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 80, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (1981) ("the usual common law principles of damages should be applied").
Michigan: Courts in both wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth cases often refer to
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), a wrongful pregnancy case.
The Troppi court held that standard tort damages were applicable, and allowed childrearing expenses with a benefits offset. The court placed heavy emphasis on the reasons
behind the parents' decision. If, for example, a sterilization operation was performed to
protect the woman's health, yet after the pregnancy "her health remained unimpaired, no
damage was suffered." Id. at 248, 187 N.W.2d at 514. Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich.
App. 357, 308 N.W.2d (1981), a subsequent wrongful birth case in Michigan also discussing damages, relied heavily on both wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy cases, especially Troppi, a wrongful pregnancy case.
For another opinion recommending no distinction between the two causes of action, see
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 486 N.E.2d 807, 411 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), in which the
dissent found that making any distinction was "drawing arbitrary and artificial boundaries," and recommended either full or no recovery in order to avoid these arbitrary
distinctions. Id. at 412, 486 N.E.2d at 819, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 907 (Wachtler, J., dissenting in
part).
14. The four states which do indicate a willingness to make the distinction are:
Texas: The Texas Supreme Court has heard only one case in this area recently. In
Nelson v. Krusen, 635 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, No. C-1429, slip op. (Tex.
1983), the court denied the wrongful birth claim because the statute of limitations had
run. The Texas courts, however, approved such a claim in Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d
124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974), and Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). In Jacobs,a wrongful birth case, the court distinguished wrongful
pregnancy from wrongful birth: "The economic burden related solely to the physical
defects of the child is a different matter which is free from [the objections present in
wrongful pregnancy cases]. Texas cases have indicated this distinction between the
cause of action which seeks damages for wrongful birth or life and the cause of action
seeking recovery of those expenditures required because the child is deformed-even
though the tort was causally related to birth itself and not to deformation alone." Id. at
849.
Wisconsin: The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished the two causes of action in
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W. 372 (1975): A Wisconsin wrongful
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in awarding damages. 15 The Illinois Appellate Court faces this
16
problem now.
A brief look at the three states which do not separate wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful birth illuminates some of the dangers
inherent in failing to differentiate between the two causes of
action. Inconsistent, arbitrary, and poorly-reasoned opinions
plague these states' wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth
Wisconsin: The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished the two causes of action in
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W. 372 (1975): A Wisconsin wrongful
pregnancy case was "distinguished from the case at hand because the parents there
sought to recover the entire expense of raising a normal, healthy but... unwanted child
during its dependency. Here the parents sue only for the expense occasioned by the congenital defects." Id. at 775, 233 N.W.2d at 376.
Florida: In Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1981), the court relied
on the Texas and Wisconsin courts' distinction. In Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.
1084, 1085 n.3 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1980), the court noted that an abnormal or unhealthy
child poses a different set of problems than a healthy child. In the Florida Supreme Court
opinion in this area, Ramey v. Fassoulas, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984), the court relied on

the Wisconsin and Texas courts' distinction in denying child-rearing costs for raising a
healthy child. One judge pointed out the distinction: Wrongful pregnancy is "primarily
distinguishable from ... wrongful birth cases in that the parents ... want a healthy
child, whereas in wrongful conception [pregnancy] cases the parents do not want a child
at all." Id. at 826 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
New York: A distinction between the two causes of action was noted in Sorkin v. Lee,
78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980): "It is one thing to tote up the medical bills and
assess damages against a negligent physician for extraordinary unanticipated expenses
resulting from the preventable birth of a defective baby.... It is quite another to assess
him for the myriad costs of raising a normal, healthy child for some indefinite period in
the future- .. " Id. at 183, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 303. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 486
N.E. 807, 411 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), is the latest opinion in this area from New York's high
court, and points to the distinction: "Standing distinctly apart from claims based upon a
wrongful conception. . . in which the essence of the wrong for which compensation is
sought is the birth of a healthy and normal-albeit unplanned-child, plaintiffs' claims
are premised upon the birth of a fully intended but abnormal child for whom extraordinary care and treatment is required." Id. at 410, 486 N.E.2d at 811, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
15. Close to 200 articles have been written about this subject. It is interesting to note,
however, that few commentators have addressed the issue of the distinction between
wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy. Commentators have instead focused initially on
two basic issues: whether a wrongful birth [or pregnancy or life] cause of action should be
recognized, and which damages formula should be used in wrongful birth [or pregnancy
or life] cases. The remainder of the writings in this area are case comments. See, e.g.,
supranotes 4-6, 8.
16. A wrongful life and wrongful birth case involving a handicapped child is presently pending in the Illinois Appellate Court. Goldberg, Nos. 81-1450, 81-1962. (Ill. App.
Ct., argued Feb. 16, Mar. 23, 1983). See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. The
plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the wrongful life cause of action (No. 81-1450), and the
defendants cross-appealed the allowance of the wrongful birth action (No. 81-1962). Only
California and Washington have allowed recovery under the wrongful life cause of
action. If the wrongful birth cause of action reaches the Illinois Supreme Court, the court
must decide whether to use its "wrongful pregnancy analysis" from Cockrum, or distinguish the analyses and resulting damage awards. See supra note 3.
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cases. 17 Such courts must often resort to distinctions based on
extraneous, sometimes arbitrary issues such as the reasons the
parents desired sterilization. 18 In addition, in the four states
which uphold the distinction between wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy, the wrong damages formula is sometimes used.
Recently, in Cockrum v. Baumgartner,19 the Illinois Supreme
Court limited damages in a wrongful pregnancy action to the
cost of the birth of the child. The court has not as yet addressed
the issue of damages for wrongful birth. 20 When this issue is
addressed, a key consideration will be whether the court should
use the same analysis and resulting damages formula it used in
Cockrum, or recognize the wrongful pregnancy/wrongful birth
distinction in its determination of damages.
This note discusses the damages formula presently used in
Illinois for wrongful pregnancy, as well as formulas used by
other courts. Two important unanswered questions are then analyzed: whether Illinois should recognize a distinction between the
wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy causes of action, and, if
so, which damages formula to use in wrongful birth cases. This
note recommends that in wrongful birth cases, Illinois courts use
the damages formula which allows recovery for the extraordinary expenses of raising a handicapped child.

17. See infra notes 107-52.
18. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). See also Hartke v.
McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing New Jersey and Pennsylvania cases,
two of the states which do not distinguish wrongful pregnancy from wrongful birth, and
citing numerous commentators). The Hartke court, however, pointed to the arbitrariness
of using parents' subjective reasons as a basis of distinction between the two causes of
action:
This approach will be primarily useful in cases in which the evidence of the
reason for undergoing sterilization is unambiguous and overwhelming, as it is
in this case. Where there is a mixture of motivations, and the socio-economic
reasons are at least a but-for reason for undergoing the operation, the trier of
fact will have to look to more direct, but perhaps less reliable, evidence of
whether the birth of a child constitutes damage to the parents.
Id. at 1555 n.12. Usually the parents' reasons are subjective, and not clear cut. This case
was an exception, because the parents knew their child might be handicapped. It is
unlikely that such an arbitrary basis for distinction would work in most other cases,
however.
19. 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp.,
104 S. Ct. 149 (1983).
20. See supra note 16.
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BACKGROUND

Application of the Standard Tort Damages Formula
Wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy cases are typically
brought as tort actions. 21 Under the standard damages formula
used in most tort cases, including wrongful birth and wrongful
pregnancy actions, 22 the injured plaintiff is returned to the posi-

21. An alternative cause of action also exists under a contract theory. It is interesting
to note that Illinois courts hold that injuries to the mother of an unplanned child, conceived after a doctor's negligently performed vasectomy on the father, is a property
injury, not a personal injury to the mother. Thus, Illinois' five year statute of limitations
13-205 (1981), not the two year discovery
for contract actions, ILL REv. STAT. ch. 110,
statute of limitations against doctors, id. 13-212, is applied. This interpretation of the
mother's injury as a property claim, however, would not help in the situation where the
suit was based on medical malpractice and the four year maximum had been reached.
See Doerr v. Villate, 74 11. App. 2d 332,220 N.E.2d 767 (1966) (male plaintiff, after unsuccessful sterilization operation, sued under a breach of warranty cause of action).
A third cause of action exists in the theory of breach of warranty. Thus, in Doerr, after
the birth of two retarded children, male plaintiff was unsuccessfully sterilized, and his
wife subsequently gave birth to a third retarded child. Plaintiffs sued under a breach of
warranty cause of action, since the four year medical malpractice statute of limitations
had passed. Because plaintiff claimed property damages, the action was not barred. See
also Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63,305 N.E.2d 571 (1973), in which the female plaintiff, after an unsuccessful sterilization operation, sued under a breach of warranty theory.
The cause of action was dismissed for failure to establish the existence of an express
warranty. The court noted that plaintiff would also be required to establish separate consideration. Doerr and Rogala are discussed in Note, Tort Damages- Wrongful BirthIllinois Appellate Court, First District, Allows Parents to Recover Costs of Rearing a
Child, 1982 S. Iii. U.LJ. 111, 118-19.
22. The chief advantage of a tort action is the potential for greater damages, including punitive damages. The major advantage of a contract action is a longer statute of
limitations than typical tort statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal.
App. 3d 189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982) (wrongful birth; statute of limitations had run);
Stewart v. Bepko, No. 81-2501, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy; three year
statute of limitations had run); Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 831, 325
N.W.2d 600 (1982) (wrongful birth; statute of limitations had run); Miller v. Duhar, 637
S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (wrongful pregnancy; two year statute of limitations had
run); Nelson v. Krusen, 635 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd., No. C-1429, slip op.
(Tex. 1983) (wrongful birth; two year statute of limitations had run). The disadvantages
of breach of warranty actions include the unavailability of punitive damages, requirements of proof of express warranty and separate consideration, and the failure of most
medical malpractice insurance policies to cover actions for breach of warranty. See generally Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Paudua Hosp., 23 III. 2d 326, 178 N.E2d 303 (1961)
(distinguishing breach of warranty and negligence actions in medical malpractice cases).
A litigant generally brings a cause of action based under a contract theory only when
faced with a tort statute of limitations which has run. See Moore, supra note 9, at 2, for
an extensive discussion of theories under which wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy
suits have been brought. Illinois plaintiffs face a particularly short medical malpractice
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tion he would have occupied had the injury not occurred. 23 The
victim receives compensation for all consequences flowing from
the tortfeasor's act. An injured plaintiff may be financially compensated for such expensesas medical costs, pain and suffering,
and lost wages. Once paid for these losses, he is considered to be
in the same legal position he occupied before the injury occurred.
In wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy cases, one significant consequence flowing from the tortfeasor's act is the child's
very existence. 24 Some courts have therefore concluded that using
the standard tort damages rule in a wrongful birth or wrongful
pregnancy suit could produce particularly inappropriate results.
Putting the parents in their original position had there been no
birth or pregnancy would mean compensating them for all
expenses resulting from the birth of their child, including the
25
cost of supporting the child until he becomes self-supporting.

statute of limitations. Plaintiffs may file within two years of the date of discovery, but
within a maximum of four years from the date the injury occurred if the defendant is a
doctor or a hospital. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 83, 22.1 (1981). This statute of limitations was
upheld in Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).

The harshness of this short statute of limitations was apparent in Anderson v.
Wagner, 61 Ill. App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (1978), aff'd, 79 111. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560
(1979), which involved a doctor's failure to inform a pregnant woman that she had
rubella during her first trimester of pregnancy. A handicapped child was born, but the
parent did not discover that the handicap was due to the mother's "rash" until many

years later. The court denied recovery due to the running of the four year statute of limitations. See also Roberson v. Taylor, 115 111. App. 3d 587, 451 N.E.2d 16 (1983) (wrongful
pregnancy; case dismissed because four year statute of limitations for medical malpractice had run; court emphasized interests of malpractice insurers).
23. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 20 (1937). See also James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41
CORNELL L. REV. 582 (1956).
24. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). Although the
plaintiff was the infant, not its parents, the principle stated by the court is nonetheless
applicable:
The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life with

defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such
a determination. This court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that he should not have
been born, the infant plaintiff make it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies.
Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692. See generally AM. JuRl (New Topic Service), Wrongful Life, § 65
(1979).
25. An equally inappropriate result would be to require mitigation of damages by
adoption or abortion. At least one court has rejected this requirement. See, e.g., Cockrum
v. Baumgartner, 95 Il. 2d at 193, 447 N.E.2d at 385, cert. denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael
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Confronted with these problems, some courts have searched
for alternative damages formulas for these causes of action. Difficulties in choosing an appropriate damages formula arise, because the ideal formula must compensate the injured parties, yet
neither overburden the tortfeasor nor stray too far from standard
tort principles and established public policies. 26 No single
dam27
ages formula has been accepted by a majority of courts.
Courts generally have determined the award of damages in
wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy cases using one or more
of four different formulas: damages for childbearing expenses
only; damages for childbearing plus child-rearing expenses, with
an offset for the benefits of parenthood; damages for childbearing plus child-rearing expenses with no benefits offset; and damages for the handicapped child's extraordinary medical and
28
caretaking expenses only.

Damages Limited To Childbearing Expenses
In 1983, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Cockrum v. Baumgartner,29 held that in wrongful pregnancy cases, 30 parents may
recover only childbearing expenses. In many other jurisdictions,

Reese Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 149.
26. See infra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
27. See infra chart immediately following the text of this note.
28. For an extensive discussion of these damages formulas and the elements of damage included within each formula, see generally University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983). A fifth option for courts is, of course,
to deny all damages. Most courts recognizing these causes of action permit recovery for
some damages, after proper proof of all tort elements, although the courts' use of one or
more of the damages formulas discussed herein may severely limit the plaintiffs recovery to minimal damages. See generally Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689
(1967); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455, aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 818,
364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc.
2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970),

aff'd mem. 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972). See also Reick v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). Not all cases which reach
the merits recognize the cause of action. See, e.g., McNeal v. United States 689 F.2d 1200
(4th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Virginia law); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983)
29. 95111. 2d 193,447 N.E.2d 385(1983).
30. The Cockrum court used the terms "wrongful pregnancy" and "wrongful birth"
interchangably. See supra note 3. Plaintiff-appellees distinguished the terms, however,
referring to their cause of action as wrongful pregnancy because the tort arose from the
physician's negligent interference with the parent's right to practice contraception. Brief
for Appellee at 14, Cockrum, 95 Ill. 2d at 196, 447 N.E.2d at 387.

19841

Wrongful Birth/Pregnancy

wrongful pregnancy cases involving healthy children 3 1 also limit
damages to expenses of the pregnancy and birth. 32 These damages generally include medical expenses, loss of wages for the
wife, loss of consortium for the husband, pain and suffering for
the wife, and the cost of the failed sterilization procedure, abor33
tion, or birth control method.
In wrongful birth cases, no court has limited damages to
childbearing expenses alone. 3 4 Some courts, however, have
denied childbearing expenses in wrongful birth cases where the
parents had intended to conceive and deliver a child, although
not a handicapped one. 35 Other courts have included childbearing expenses in larger awards, reasoning that the parents would
have aborted had they known of the handicap, and thus would
not have incurred the pregnancy and birth-related expenses
absent defendant's negligence. 36
Damages for Child-Rearing: Benefits Offset
Six of the twenty-three jurisdictions which have considered
wrongful pregnancy claims have allowed parents to recover
childbearing expenses, plus damages for rearing and educating
the child.3 7 These courts have imposed significant limitations on
the amounts recoverable, however, by requiring an offset for the
benefits of parenting, primarily the joy of sharing the child's life.
Only two of the twelve jurisdictions facing wrongful birth cases
have used the benefits offset rule, 38 which appears in section 920

31. See supra note 7, discussing exceptions to the general rule that wrongful pregnancy cases involve only healthy children.
32. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rearing
expenses denied because plaintiff testified that after she discovered her unplanned pregnancy, which occurred after an unsuccessful sterilization, she felt the birth might possibly
be a positive experience; court placed heavy emphasis on plaintiffs reason for desiring to
be sterilized). For other courts approving this formula in wrongful pregnancy cases, see
supra note 27. For a recent commentary approving the use of this formula in determining
damages, see Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy:Recovery for Raising A Healthy Child, 10
N. Ky. L. REV. 341 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 450
So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
34. See supra note 27.
35. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
36. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama
law).
37. These states are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Pennsylvania. See supra note 27.
38. These states are: Pennsylvania and South Carolina. Id.
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of the Restatement (Second)of Torts. 39

40
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Cockrum v. Baumgartner,
expressly refused to use the benefits offset rule in a wrongful
pregnancy case involving a healthy child. The Illinois Appellate
Court had earlier attempted to apply the benefits offset rule in
two wrongful pregnancy cases. 41 The lower court's losing position was championed by the dissent in the Illinois Supreme
Court opinion in Cockrum, which stated that a jury should be
given the flexibility to take numerous factors into consideration

39.

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs states that,
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his

property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). For strong criticism of the use of section
920, see Kashi, Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409
(1977):

If the forced parent is willing to shoulder the enormous responibility of parenthood, the law should not throw obstacles in his path but rather should endeavor
to do everything in its power to assist him. If this places a difficult burden on
the defendant, it is well to remember that he is a tortfeasor, and it is far more
equitable to shift the burden to him than to the plaintiffs who placed their faith
in him, or the innocent infant for whose birth he is responsible.
Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 428 A.2d 1366, 1374 (Pa. Super Ct. 1981) (Brosky, J., concurring) (quoting Kashi, supra, at 1416-17).
The rule includes a provision requiring the benefit to be the same type of interest as the
injury. Thus, if the parents claim emotional injury and corresponding damages for pain
and suffering, the emotional benefits are of the same interest and may be offset. If the
parents claim only pecuniary damages, however, and the benefits are typically characterized as emotional, there would be no offset under a strict application of section 920.
One lower court in Illinois has acknowledged this same-interest provision. See, e.g., Cockrum, 99 111. App. 3d at 271, 425 N.E.2d at 968. The Illinois Supreme Court has refused to
apply the benefits offset rule. See Cockrum, 95 Ill.
2d at 194, 447 N.E.2d at 385.
The same interest requirement of section 920 reads: "Limitation to same interest. Damages; resulting from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that
Damages for pain and suffering are not diminanother interest has been benefitted ....
ished by showing that the earning capacity by the plaintiff has been increased by the
defendant's act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1979). One judge

reasoned: "A proper application of the (same interest) requirement in a wrongful pregnancy case would require that pecuniary harm of raising the child be offset only by
corresponding pecuniary benefit, and emotional benefits of the parent-child relationship
be applied as an offset only to corresponding emotional harm." University of Ariz.
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 589, 667 P.2d 1294, 1304 (1983)
(Gordon, J., concurring and dissenting).
40. 95111. 2d at 194,447 N.E.2d at 385.
41. Illinois cases advocating the use of the benefits offset rule include: Pierce v.
DeGracia, 103 III. App. 3d 511,513,431 N.E.2d 738, 740(1982); Cockrum, 99111. App. 3d at
275, 425 N.E.2d at 972 (Linn, J. and Romiti, J., specially concurring), rev'd, 95 III. 2d 193,
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in determining what damages to award. 42 In no Illinois appellate court decision has the benefits offset rule been applied in a
43
case involving a handicapped child.
Full Damages for Child-Rearing: No Offset
Several courts have allowed full damages for childbearing,
rearing and educating the child, and emotional injury44 to the
parents in both wrongful birth 45 and pregnancy cases. 46 The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected this approach in Cockrum, holding that as a matter of law a parent is not injured by the birth of
a healthy child. 47 The appellate court had allowed the plaintiffs
full recovery for the cost of rearing their healthy child, relying on
the traditional tort rule that a tortfeasor is liable for all injuries
which are the proximate result of the tort.48 Moreover, in avoiding any use of the benefits offset rule, the appellate court relied
on the distinction between the pecuniary damages plaintiffs
sought and the emotional benefits of parenthood which the con49
curring justices wished to offset.

Other courts have severely criticized use of the full damages

447 N.E.2d 385 (1983).
42. The dissent stated:
The essential point, of course, is that the trier must have the power to evaluate
the benefit according to all the circumstances of the case presented. Family size,
family income, age of the parents, and marital status are some, but not all, the
factors which the trier must consider in determining the extent to which the
birth of a particular child represents a benefit to his parents. That the benefits
so conferred and calculated will vary widely from case to case is inevitable.
Cockrum, 95 Ill. 2d at 209, 447 N.E.2d at 393 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971)).
43. The benefits offset rule could be applied by the First District, as it was in Cockrum, however, in a pending case. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of emotional damages in these cases, see Capron, supra note 5, at
639; Note, Robak v. United States: A Precedent Setting Damage Formula for Wrongful
Birth, 58 CHI.-KENT L REv. 725, 738 (1982); Note, Fatherand Mother Know Best: Defining
the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE UJ. 1488, 1513
(1978). A discussion of the topic of emotional damages is beyond the scope of this note.
45. See supra note 27.
46. Id.
47. 95111. 2d at 198,447 N.E.2d at 388.
48. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 272-73, 425 N.E.2d at 969-70. Other courts have also relied on
traditional torts analyses in awarding full damages. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658
F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law).
49. 99 Il. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970. The Illinois Supreme Court failed to
address this point; however, both plaintiffs and defendants argued the point in their
briefs. See also supra note 39.
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formula in both wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth cases.5 0
Most of these courts base this rejection on their refusal to recognize the birth of any child, healthy or handicapped, as anything
but a blessing.5 1
Damages Allowed for Extraordinary Expenses
Some plaintiffs in wrongful birth cases have sought only
damages for extraordinary medical and caretaking expenses. 52 In
other wrongful birth cases, courts have limited recovery to extraordinary expenses, regardless of what the plaintiffs seek. 53 Some
courts have limited damages for parents of healthy children to
childbearing expenses only, but later allowed extraordinary
expenses to parents of handicapped children. 54 Typically, these
courts reason that many of the policy barriers 55 involved in
cases where the parents are "blessed" 56 with a healthy child
disappear when the parents give birth to a child who will die
within a few years 57 or will lead a severely impaired life.5 8
Confronted with the choice of four different damages formulas,
with results ranging from very limited recovery to recovery of

50. See, e.g., University of Ariz., 136 Ariz. at 580, 667 P.2d at 1299.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
53. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Naccash v.
Burger, 223 Va. 406,290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (handicapped child;
extraordinary expenses awarded); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (healthy child; damages limited to childbearing expenses).
55. See infra notes 136-45.
56. Compare Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 124, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934)
(first announcing the "blessing" theory) with Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169, 173 (Minn. 1977) (severely limiting the "blessing" theory).
57. For example, a Tay Sachs baby usually dies within the first five years of life. See
infra note 106.
58. Down's Syndrome is often the abnormality giving rise to a claim of wrongful
birth. Down's Syndrome is defined as:
[A] syndrome of mental retardation associated with a variable constellation of
abnormalities caused by representation of at least a critical portion of all
chromosome 21 three times instead of twice in some or all hypoplastic face with
short nose, prominent opicanthic skin folds, protuding lower hip, small rounded
ears with prominent antihelix, fissure and thickened tongue, laxness of joint
ligaments, pelvic dysplasia, broad hands and feet, stubby fingers... dry rough
skin in older patients and abundant slack neck skin in newborn ......
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 539 n.3 (D.S.C. 1980) (quoting STEDMAN'S MED.
DICTIONARY 1382 (4th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1976)).
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full damages, courts vary greatly in their approaches to awarding damages. A major variable seems to be whether the child is
handicapped or healthy. The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet
59
addressed the issue of damages in a wrongful birth case.
Although not all courts make the distinction, the Illinois Supreme
Court indicated in Cockrum that it might be willing to recognize
a healthy as opposed to a handicapped child as a significant
variable.
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY DAMAGES IN ILLINOIS:
COCKRUM V. BA UMGARTNER
6 0 and its companion case, Raja v.
Cockrum v. Baumgartner
61
Tulsky, were both suits in which healthy children were born as
a result of improperly performed sterilization procedures. In Cockrum, the defendant doctor had negligently performed a vasectomy on the father of the unplanned child. 6 2 Approximately two
and one-half months later, the mother discovered she was pregnant, and subsequently gave birth to a healthy boy.6 3 In Raja,
the plaintiff experienced signs of pregnancy five years after a
tubal ligation. By the time the pregnancy was confirmed, it was
too late to obtain a medically safe abortion. 64 She subsequently
65
gave birth to a healthy child.
In both Cockrum and Raja, the parents sued their doctor and
the hospital at which the procedure was performed in tort, seeking damages for medical expenses, time lost in having the child,
and the future expenses of raising the child.6 6 In both cases, the
trial court dismissed the counts seeking damages for the costs
raising and educating the child. The cases were consolidated on
67
appeal.

59.
60.
Hosp.,
61.
62.

See supra note 16.
95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael Reese
104 S. Ct. 149 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 195, 447 N.E.2d at 386.

63. Id.
64. Id., 447 N.E.2d at 387. She was examined and told by the defendant hospital's
clinic employees that she was not pregnant. Two months later she returned to the clinic

after having experienced additional symptoms of pregnancy. The clinic then informed
the plaintiff that she was indeed pregnant.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 196, 447 N.E.2d at 387.
67. Id.
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The Illinois Appellate Court
The Illinois Appellate Court issued a split decision. The majority held that the plaintiffs should receive the full measure of
damages caused by the defendants' negligence. 68 The court stated
that in awarding damages a benefits offset should not be used:
"Section 920 clearly provides that a benefit to the plaintiff caused
by defendant's tortious act may be considered in mitigation only
69
where the benefit is to the same interest which was harmed."
The court thus found section 920 inapplicable, reasoning that the
rewards of parenthood involve emotional interests, while the
70
parents' injuries in Cockrum involved financial interests.
In their concurring opinions, Justices Linn and Romiti stated
that the benefits offset rule should have been applied. 71 Both
reasoned that parenthood should not be considered a benefit
which automatically outweighs all injuries, but that the jury
should have been allowed to consider all of the various factors in
each plaintiffs case. 7 2 Justice Linn pointed out that the "application of the special benefits rule in these cases will grant the
trier of fact a degree of flexibility in calculating damages .... '-73
The Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting, reversed the appellate court, holding that the plaintiffs' damages
were limited to childbearing expenses.7 4 The court apparently

68. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 274,425 N.E.2d at 970.
69. Id.
70. Id. Accord Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476
(1976). See also Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable For the Wrongful
Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1326 (1982). Cf Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1558
n.16 ("The overwhelming majority of courts that have invoked the benefits rule in wrongful conception cases have rejected the strict terms of the Restatement approach.")
71. 99 Ill App. 3d at 275-77, 425 N.E.2d at 971-73 (Romiti, J., and Linn, J., specially
concurring).
72. Id. Factors include family size, income, the ages of the parents, and marital status.
73. Id. at 277, 425 N.E.2d at 973.
74. 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983). At the time Illinois Supreme Court decided
Cockrum there was a three-way split in the Illinois Appellate Court concerning what
damages should be awarded in wrongful pregnancy cases. See Cockrum, 99 Ill. App. 3d
271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1983) (full damages; wrongful pregnancy case); Pierce v. DeGracia,
103 Ill. App. 3d 511, 431 N.E.2d 768 (1982) (benefits offset rule used; wrongful pregnancy
case); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979) (pregnancyrelated damages; wrongful pregnancy case).
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took into account that the plaintiffs' children were healthy, not
handicapped, and repeatedly emphasized the healthy condition
of the Cockrum and Raja children. 75 The court found that there
was "no indication that the children are other than normal and
healthy"76 and emphasized the fact that many courts have shown
"an unwillingness to hold that the birth of a normal, healthy
child can be judged to be an injury to parents." 77 The court also
found that the "costs of rearing a normal and healthy child cannot be recovered as damages to the parents ....
-"78 Moreover,
the cases on which the court relied primarily involved healthy
79
children.
Damages Issues
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed a number of issues in
holding that plaintiffs could recover damages only for childbearing expenses when a healthy child was involved.8 0 First, the
court found certain elements of plaintiffs' claims too speculative
to warrant an award of damages, because the amounts involved
were too difficult to prove. 81 The court noted that courts in other
jurisdictions have split on the question of whether the damages
82
in these sorts of cases are too speculative.

75. See infra note 110.
76. 95 Ill.
2d at 196, 447 N.E.2d at 387 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 199, 447 N.E.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
79. Conspicuous by its absence was any discussion of Robak v. United States, 658
F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law), the first federal court of appeals decision in this area of law. Robak, unlike Cockrum, involved a handicapped child. The failure of the court to mention Robak, except in regard to mitigation of damages, is consistent with the court's choice of precedent dealing only with healthy children.
80. 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983). Some arguments against allowing substantial
damages, which are very similar to the arguments relied on in Cockrum, are discussed in
Moore, supra note 9, at 4-12.
81. 95 111. 2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388 (citing Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434
N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980)).
82. Accord Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975) (wrongful pregnancy);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 24, 227 A.2d 689, 691 (1967) (wrongful birth); Sorkin,
A.D.2d at 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 301. Contra University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v.
Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983): "[J]uries in tort cases are often required
to assess just such intangible factors, both emotional and pecuniary, and see no reason
why a new rule should be adopted for wrongful pregnancy cases." Id. at 583, 667 P.2d at
1297-98. See also Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ochs v.
Borelli, 187 Conn. 253, 260, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
261-62, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521, leave to appealdenied, 385 Mich. 753, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971);
Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 428 A.2d 1366, 1372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (en banc) (Brosky,
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The Cockrum court also expressed concern about the effect of
the child's discovery of his parents' pursuit of a tort claim. The
child could conclude he was "unwanted" and that his parents
were, in fact, awarded damages to compensate them for his presence in their lives.8 3 The court found that awarding damages for
the conception or birth of the "unwanted" child would subvert
the state's public policy, which "commands the development and
preservation of family relations. '8 4 The use of the benefits offset
rule was viewed as particularly offensive to the public policy
which requires the preservation of family relations, which the
court interpreted as requiring "that the parents demonstrate not
only that they did not want the child but that the child has been
of minimal value to them. 85 While some members of the judiciary in other jurisdictions have shared the Cockrum court's concern for potential psychological harm to the child8 6 and have
relied on this factor in denying or limiting damages, other courts
are in accord with the Cockrum dissent and have dismissed the
87
notion of psychological harm with little or no difficulty.
The court noted that an award of anything beyond childbearing expenses for a healthy child would unduly burden the defendant.88 Further, damages for child-rearing expenses would allow
the plaintiffs to enjoy the benefits of parenthood, while shifting
all or some of the financial burden of raising the child to the

J., concurring), vacated, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Moore, supra note 9, at 6 (discussing three weaknesses in this argument: first, the law permits awards in other factual
settings in which it is difficult to put a monetary amount on an injury; second, statistics
are available for determining the cost of raising a child; and, third, it is unjust to withhold all relief when precise damages are hard to calculate). For a recent wrongful life case
discussing speculative damages, see Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656
P.2d 483 (1983).
83. 195 Ill. 2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388 (citing Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d
568 (1982)).
84. Id. at 201,447 N.E.2d at 390.
85. Id. at 202, 447 N.E.2d at 390.
86. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.
236, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). See also Note, Wrongful
Birth: A Childof Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 65 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); University of Ariz.,
136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Min.
1977). See generally,Moore, supra note 9, at 10-11.
88. 95 Ill. 2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388 (citing White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146
(D. Kan. 1981) (applying Georgia law)); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003
(1982).
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defendant. 89 The court rejected completely the use of the benefits
offset rule, 90 noting that the burden on the defendant will often
be disproportionate to his culpability and would thus mean a
windfall for the plaintiffs. 91
The court was also concerned that damages for child-rearing
"would open the door to false claims and fraud." 92 The Cockrum
court noted that other courts have shown a similar concern, finding that wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy actions are
93
very tempting to the unscrupulous.
In addition, the Cockrum court addressed several public policies in justifying its decision to limit damages in wrongful pregnancy cases involving healthy children. The court found the
"right to privacy" defined in Roe v. Wade94 and Griswold v.
Connecticut95 irrelevant to the issue of whether damages may be
recovered under the fact situation present in Cockrum for
expenses after the birth of the child. 96 By contrast, the appellate
court in Cockrum had found these policies highly relevant,
because the "right of privacy" recognized in Roe and Griswold
encompasses the couple's right to decide whether they will have
child an issue inherent in wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy cases. In the appellate court's view, the violation of this

89. Cockrum, 95 Il.2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388.
90. See supratext accompanying notes 37-43, discussing the benefits offset rule.
91. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
92. 95 Ill. 2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388 (citing Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.
2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982)).
93. University of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 579, 588, 667 P.2d 1294, 1302-03 (1983) (Gordon, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing Cox v. Stretton, 77 Wis. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974)
(cause of action by the unplanned child's siblings, who claimed they now received less
care and financial support was dismissed)).

94. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's right to choose abortion). Many courts have found
Roe and Griswold highly relevant in wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy cases. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,
356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). The Court, in Roe, stated that:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life
and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
34 U.S. at 153.
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (couple's right to choose to use contraceptives).
96. 95 Ill. 2d at 202, 447 N.E.2d at 390.
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right results in an injury which should be compensated. 97
Another public policy issue considered by the court was that
an award of damages could lead to the conclusion "that a child
can be considered an injury."98 Such a conclusion would offend

"fundamental values attached to human life." 99 Moreover, the
court stated, "[Iln a proper hierarchy of values, the benefits of
life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting it.
Respect for life and the rights proceeding from it are at the heart
of our legal system and, broader still, our civilization."' 100

97. 99 Ill.
App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970. Typical of many courts' analyses of these
issues, one court articulated the applicability of Supreme Court abortion and contraception cases to wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy: "Public policy and social conscience no longer dictate judicial blindness and inaction with respect to the plight of a
woman who has wrongfully been denied the opportunity to determine her destiny in
whether or not to give birth to a gravely handicapped infant." Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 436, 404 A.2d 8, 16 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring).
98. 95 Ill. 2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388. This same view was expressed in Wilczynski,
73 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 391 N.E.2d at 487.
99. 95 ill. 2d at 198, 447 N.E.2d at 388.
100. Id. at 201, 447 N.E.2d at 389. Cf. University of Ariz., 135 Ariz. at 579, 667 P.2d at
1298-99 (heavily criticizing the language used in Cockrum). Accord Hartke, 707 F.2d at
1552.
The Cockrum court noted that an earlier Illinois Appellate Court wrongful pregnancy
case had relied heavily on the Illinois Abortion Act's stated policy of protecting human
life. 95 Ill. 2d at 201, 447 N.E.2d at 389 (citing Wilczynski, 73 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 389 N.E.2d
at 479). The Wilczynski court discussed abortion cases extensively, finding them inapplicable because of the Illinois' stated "pro-life" policy. The Wilcynski court, like the Illinois
Supreme Court in Cockrum, limited damages to pregnancy and birth related costs.
Illinois' unusual statutory "pro-life" policy is found in the state's Abortion Act. Section
1 of the Act begins with a strong statement:
It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably
regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court of January 22, 1973 [Roe]. Without in any way restricting the
right of privacy of a woman or the right of a woman to an abortion under those
decisions, the General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and
find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn
child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal
person for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right
to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State. Further,
the General Assembly finds and declares that longstanding policy of this state
to protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by prohibiting
abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother is impermissible
only because of the decision of the United States Supreme Court and that,
therefore, if those decisions are ever reversed or modified or the United States
Constitution is amended to allow protection of the unborn then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of
the mother's life shall be reinstated.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 81-21 (1981).
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Finally, the Cockrum court noted that under the standard tort
damages formula, a defendant should be liable for all of the
costs incurred by plaintiffs as a result of the tortfeasor's conduct. 1° 1 Although the dissent considered this standard appropriate, with an offset for benefits, the majority held the rule
inapplicable in wrongful pregnancy cases. 10 2 The court emphasized the need to draw the line in the determination and award
of tort damages, 10 3 observing that many courts agree that the
standard rule does not fit the wrongful pregnancy and wrongful
10 4
birth situations.
PENDING QUESTIONS IN ILLINOIS

Two major questions remaining in Illinois are whether Illinois
courts will recognize a distinction between wrongful birth and
wrongful pregnancy cases, and, if so, what damages formula
Illinois will use for wrongful birth suits. The urgency of these
questions is exemplified by the case of Goldberg v. Ruskin, 10 5
now pending before the Illinois Appellate Court. In Goldberg, a
baby boy born with Tay Sachs disease' 0 6 died at age two and
one-half. The parents were both Jewish and of Eastern European
descent, thus at a high risk of being Tay Sachs carriers. 10 7 The
parents claimed that the doctor should have inquired about their
ethnic background and should have advised them of the risks,
thus giving them the opportunity to obtain simple tests and an
abortion if these tests showed that the baby did in fact have Tay

101.
102.
103.

95 I1. 2d at 197, 447 N.E.2d at 390.
Id.
"Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, with-

out end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree." Cockrum, 95 111. 2d at 197, 447 N.E.2d at 390 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman,
24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969)).
104. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
105. Goldberg v. Ruskin, Nos. 81-1450, 81-1962 (111. App. Ct. argued Feb. 16, Mar. 23,
1983).
106. Tay Sachs can be detected by a simple blood test. The disease has been defined
as:
[A]n invariably fatal disease of the brain and spinal cord that occurs in Jewish
infants of eastern European ancestry. A diseased child appears normal at birth,
but, at four to six months, its central nervous system begins to degenerate, and
it suffers eventual blindness, deafness, paralysis, seizures, and mental retardation. The life expectancy of an afflicted child is two to four years.
Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406,408,290 S.E.2d 825,827 (1982).
107. Brief for Appellants at 6, Brief for Appellee at 2, Goldberg, Nos. 81-1450, 81-1962
(Ill. App. Ct. argued Feb. 16, Mar. 23,1983).
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Sachs disease. 10 8 The trial court struck and dismissed with prejudice Count I, the child's wrongful life claim.109 The court
refused to dismiss the parents' wrongful birth claim, however,
and held that the extraordinary medical expenses incurred by
the parents were recoverable. This case is presently on review
before the Illinois Appellate Court.
In analyzing how Illinois courts should determine damages in
wrongful birth cases, it may be useful to examine more closely
the differences between wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy
causes of action. Of particular importance is whether the wrongful pregnancy damages analysis utilized by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Cockrum is suitable for wrongful birth cases, such as
Goldberg, under Illinois law. Courts which have refused to distinguish between wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy have
often become entangled in inconsistent analyses, resulting in
arbitrary judgments and little or no guidelines for future courts
and litigants. 110 Illinois should thus take care to avoid these
problems by differentiating between wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy claims in determining the appropriate award of
damages.

108.

Id.

109. Id.
110. An example of one such state is New Jersey. An extensive analysis of New Jersey wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy decisions is beyond the scope of this article.
The New Jersey cases are used merely to show the danger of failing to carefully distinguish between two emerging tort causes of action, wrongful pregnancy and wrongful
birth. New Jersey appellate courts have heard four wrongful birth and three wrongful
pregnancy cases, five of which have occurred during the past five years. The various
holdings include: no recovery for medical costs allowed in a wrongful birth suit, but recovery for emotional costs allowed, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); no
recovery for any costs, including birth-related expenses, allowed in a wrongful pregnancy
case, in accordance with Berman,J.P.M. v. Schmid Laboratories, 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428
A.2d 515 (1981); no wrongful birth cause of action exists, Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.
22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); wrongful birth cause of action exists but damages issue cannot be
reached because of evidentiary problems, Comras v. Lewin, 183 N.J. Super. 42, 443 A.2d
229 (1982); wrongful birth damages include extraordinary medical expenses, Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981); wrongful pregnancy damages include full damages with a benefits offset, Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981);
and wrongful pregnancy damages limited to pregnancy and birth-related expenses, P. v.
Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981).
For an excellent discussion of the general confusion in this area and an extremely
well-reasoned opinion, see generally Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash.
1983). The Harbeson court, in order to avoid confusion, used the four elements of any
negligence cause of action: duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury. Id. at 487.
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The Non-Speculative Nature of ExtraordinaryDamages
Extraordinary damages are not overly speculative in wrongful
birth cases. The medical expenses of a handicapped child and
the costs of such a child's special education and caretaking
needs can be calculated with relative ease.11 1 One court, in distinguishing wrongful birth cases from wrongful pregnancy
claims, stated that wrongful birth expenses "lie within the
methods of proof by which the courts are accustomed to deter12
min[ing] awards in personal injury cases."'
New Jersey courts, in refusing to distinguish wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth causes of action, have not been consistent in their treatment of extraordinary damages. For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found all but emotional damages
too speculative in one wrongful birth case, holding that even the
medical expenses of raising plaintiffs' Down's Syndrome child
were speculative and disproportionate to defendant's wrongdoing." 3 Only two years later, the same court allowed damages
for medical expenses, finding medical expenses not overly speculative, 1 4 stating, in direct contradiction to its language two
years earlier, 115 that the previous case did not address the issue
of medical expenses." 6 Similarly, a New Jersey appellate court,
in a wrongful pregnancy case, relying on the earlier New Jersey
Supreme Court case, allowed medical expenses incurred during

111. For Illinois' treatment of speculative damages in another situation, see, e.g.,
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983) (discussing damages
under a bystander's cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
112. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975). It is interesting to note that
another court also applied this reasoning to wrongful pregnancy cases: "We think juries
in tort cases are often required to assess... intangible factors, both emotional and pecuniary, and see no reason why a new rule should be adopted for wrongful pregnancy
cases." University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579,
585, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 (1983). That court also stated that "uncertainty as to the amount
of those damages will not preclude recovery and is a question for the jury." Id.
113. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,425, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
114. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981): "That kind of expense, regularly measured by the courts, includes.., prescriptions ... check-ups ... hospitalization. . and therapy." Id. at 68, 432 A.2d at 841.
115. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1977): "As noted earlier, the first item
sought to be recompensed is the medical and other expenses .... Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at
14 (emphasis added).
116. The dissent in Schroeder pointed out this inconsistency: "Berman expressly
rejected plaintiffs' claims for medical expenses ... 87 N.J. at 72, 432 A.2d at 843 n.1
(Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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the pregnancy and delivery. 117 Another New Jersey appellate
court disapproved such limited damages in a wrongful pregnancy case, instead awarding full damages, including the rearing of the healthy child, and stating that the wrongful birth
damages are actually more speculative than wrongful pregnancy
damages."18
No EmotionalHarm to Child in
Awarding ExtraordinaryDamages
Awarding damages now in a wrongful birth suit will not later
harm the child emotionally. Most children would be able to
understand the purpose of a lawsuit designed to help their parents ease the financial burden of the child's handicap." 9 To
minimize the effect on the child, some courts have addressed
parts of their opinions to the child, cautioning him not to be
upset by any knowledge of the suit. 120 Some parents file suit
' 12 1
under the name "Anonymous.
In addition, many of the children born with such severe conditions as Tay Sachs disease, Down's Syndrome, or Rubella Syndrome, are not capable of understanding, and therefore being
harmed by, the knowledge that their parents would have aborted
them rather than have them live severely impaired, and often
quite short, lives. It is true that a few of those who live long
enough and are not too severely handicapped might possibly
understand. 122 The majority, however, will not. The potential for

117. P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465,468, 432 A.2d 556,559(1983).
118. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super 69, 75, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (1975): While
wrongful pregnancy damages are "relatively tangible and measurable factors," the dam-

ages in a wrongful birth case involve "intangible, unmeasurable and complex factors."
119. Furthermore, "there is a distinct difference between being unplanned and
unloved, and by the time the child is old enough to understand . .. he should have
independent evidence of the nature of his parents' feelings toward him." Moore, supra
note 9, at 11.
120. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 770, 219 N.W.2d 242,
245-46 (1975): "[Wle do not understand this complaint as implying any present rejection
or future strain upon the parent-child relationship. Rather we see it as an endeavor on the
part of clients and counsel to determine the outer limits of physician liability .. " This
language is quoted in White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 150 (Dist. Ct. Kan. 1981)
(applying Georgia law), addressed to the child: "To Elijah, who may some day read this
opinion and question the purpose of his family's' actions ....
See also Coleman v.
Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 14 (Del. 1975): "We say to him [the child] and we emphasize this,
that we regard this case, not as one founded on rejection of him as a person .... "
121. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126,36 A.2d 204 (1976).
122. One judge, however, felt that a "few are too many." University of Ariz., 136 Ariz.
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the child of wrongful birth plaintiffs to be hurt by the knowledge
of his parents' suit is thus significantly less than the harm the
Cockrum court foresaw a healthy child experiencing upon learning that his parents never planned to conceive him. Moreover, even
in wrongful pregnancy cases, some courts have remained unconvinced "that the effect on the child will be significantly detrimental in every case, or even in most cases ....[W]e think the

123
parents, not the courts, are the ones who must weigh the risk."
The New Jersey courts are silent on this issue, in contrast to
most other courts addressing wrongful pregnancy causes of action. 124 The New Jersey courts' silence may be a result of the
difficulty in applying a wrongful pregnancy analysis to a
wrongful birth cause of action. The idea of a three-year old child
dying of Tay Sachs Disease or a severely retarded thirty-year old
with Rubella worrying about his parents' damages award seems
absurd. The same analysis cannot be applied to the two different
causes of action.

Defendants Not UnreasonablyBurdened
by ExtraordinaryDamages
Awarding substantial damages does not unreasonably burden
defendants in wrongful birth cases. Admittedly, the burden on
the defendant is often much greater in the case of a handicapped
child than in the case of a healthy child. 125 Although a Tay
Sachs baby usually lives less than five years 126 and might therefore have limited expenses, a Down's Syndrome child often lives
a relatively long life, and requires a great deal of financial support. Often Down's children never become self-supporting, even

579, 587, 667 P.2d 1294, 1302 k1983) (Gordon, J., concurring and dissenting).
123. University of Ariz., id. at 585, 667 P.2d at 1300 (citing Hartke v. McKelway, 707
F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
124. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wibur v. Kerr, 275
Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974).
125. It is interesting to note in this context that Illinois courts do not find it unreasonable to burden a father with support payments even when he is denied all benefits of
parenthood, custody, visitation, etc. See, e.g., Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317,410 N.E.2d 12
(1980); In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 Ill.
App. 3d 666, 431 N.E.2d 1120 (1981); Huckaby
v. Huckaby, 75 Ill. App. 3d 195,393 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
126. See supra note 106.
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as adults. A court might therefore carefully weigh the injury
caused by the tortfeasor against the financial burden he will be
asked to carry if full damages are awarded to the plaintiffs. One
court relied on the fact that the enormity of the financial burden
upon the negligent defendant was not present because the plaintiffs child had Tay Sachs disease and would not live long. The
child's "life was measured in months, and the cost of her care
127
and treatment was relatively inexpensive."'
The New Jersey courts differ on the question of what an undue
burden on a defendant is. One wrongful pregnancy court found
child-rearing expenses disproportionate to the defendant's tor129
tious act, 1 28 while a second wrongful pregnancy court did not.
One wrongful pregnancy court found all medical and childrearing expenses out of proportion, 30 while a second wrongful
birth court found medical expenses proportionate to the tortious
act, and wrongful pregnancy rearing expenses disproportionate.

13 1

A more consistent analysis would have resulted had wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful birth been distinguished. The doctor's
negligence might be in failing to diagnose a pregnancy, or it
might be in convincing a woman with Rubella that she only has
an allergy. The doctor's burden can hardly be measured without
looking at the differences in the negligent act and the injury
which resulted.
Less Potentialfor False Claims When
Court Awards ExtraordinaryDamages
Awarding damages would not create a potential for false
claims in wrongful birth cases. Suits involving handicapped
children will not involve such high risks of fraud, since the inju-

127. Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 415, 290 S.E. 825, 830 (1982). That court went on
to state that even if an extended life were anticipated, damages should not automatically
be denied: "Even so, we do not necessarily agree that, if liability is established and the
damages claimed are compensable and just, the court should perform a balancing test
between competing economic interests in determining whether an injured party is
entitled to a particular category of damages."

128. P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 467, 432 A.2d 556, 558 (1983).
129.
130.

Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 72, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (1975).
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 427, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979), later relied on in J.P.M.

v. Schmid, 178 N.J. Super. 122, 124, 428 A.2d 515,517 (N.J. Super A.D. 1981).
131.

Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53,61,432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981).
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ries are more easily proved and the damages less speculative. 13 2 Concerns over fraudulent claims and floods of litigation
have arisen before, and the Illinois courts have not allowed such
concerns to block a just award of damages. 133 One Illinois court,
in a different area of torts, pointed out the importance of continu13 4
ing this policy.
The New Jersey courts have remained silent on the issue of
fraudulent claims, in contrast to many other courts considering
claims in the area. 135 Without making a distinction between
wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth, the question of the likelihood that fraudulent claims might be brought is difficult to
analyze, and perhaps simply easier for some courts not to address
at all.
Public Policy Issues in Awarding
ExtraordinaryDamages
Public policy does not preclude substantial damage awards in
wrongful birth suits. Illinois courts could reasonably find Roe v.
Wade 36 and Griswold v. Connecticut137 applicable in wrongful
38
birth cases, perhaps more so than in wrongful pregnancy cases.'
Certainly the parents of a potentially handicapped child are
more likely to choose to abort, and perhaps that choice plays a
far more vital role when a parent is told, or should have been
told, that the fetus suffers from a serious or even fatal disease. 39

132. Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 415, 290 S.W. 825, 830 (1982).
133. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 111. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983); Naccash
v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d
514, 219 N.E.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). The importance of recognizing the danger of fraud in wrongful birth actions is addressed in Comment, supra note 10, at 141-42.
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Roe and Griswold decisions have been held applicable
by some courts on the theory that the doctor's negligence precludes any parental decision
to abort the child. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp 537, 542-43 (D.S.C.
1980). See supra notes 94-97.
138. See supra notes 94, 100.
139. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. at 696 (E.D. Pa.
1978). The defendant in Gildiner stated that the wrongful birth cause of action recognizes
the denial of a chance to abort and argued that this encouraged a "Facist-Orwellian
societal attitude of genetic purity." Id. at 696. The court disagreed, pointing out that the
main value of genetic testing programs "is based on the opportunity of parents to abort
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The New Jersey courts, like most courts, find public policy
regarding abortion and contraception an important consideration in wrongful birth cases. 140 The New Jersey Supreme Court
has recognized a woman's right to decide whether to bear a
handicapped child,' 4 ' but has never addressed the issue in a
wrongful pregnancy case. This is probably because the analyses
must differ. In a wrongful birth claim, for example, a major reason for requiring the medical community to avoid negligence in
genetic testing is so that the woman can choose to abort if she
feels it is necessary. The reasoning cannot be applied to wrongful pregnancy. The New Jersey courts simply create confusion
by attempting to treat the two causes of action similarly.
Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to recognize
a human life as a compensable injury might be tempered in the
case of a handicapped child where the injury done to the parents
is much clearer. Most Illinois decisions show a strong regard for
life, 14 2 yet some Illinois decisions also show a clear recognition
that not all life is an automatic blessing. 143 It is perhaps easier
to find some injury to the parents when their child faces an
impaired life' 4 4 or a life shortened by a fatal disease than when
their child is born healthy and strong. Even courts which have
held that they cannot measure life with defects against no life at
all in a child's wrongful life case have found the parents' wrong-

afflicted fetuses, within appropriate time limitations." Id. The court went on to find that
society "has an interest in insuring that genetic testing is properly performed and interpreted." Id. at 695-96.
140. "Inherent in all the cases are sensitive issues concerning procreation and the
right to prevent it by contraception or abortion." Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 67, 432
A.2d 834, 841 (1981).
141. Id. at 53, 432 A.2d at 841.
142. Consistent with Illinois' strong pro-life public policy, see supra note 100, the Illinois judiciary offers great protection to the unborn child injured through pre-natal torts,
and even pre-conception torts. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (mother injured by negligently administered blood transfusion eight
years before plaintiff child conceived). Renslow has been cited in various discussions of
wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy. See, e.g., Wagner, Wrongful Life:
Is Denial of this Cause of Action Consistent with Current Tort Law?, 29 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 137, 142 n.25 (1983); Note, Torts-Preconception-Infant'sRight to Cause of
Action, 50 TENN. L. REv. 195, 200-01 (1982).
143. See generally In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361 (1965) (supporting Illinois
citizens' right to refuse medical treatment for any reason whatsoever).
144. See generally Helvey v. Rednour, 86 Ill. App. 3d 154, 408 N.E.2d 17 (1980) (discussing Illinois policy regarding rights of retarded persons in the areas of contraception,
procreation, and adoption).
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ful birth claim "a different matter which is free from the above
objection."' 145 Moreover, the public policy requiring the preservation of family relationships has little relevance to situations
where, for example, a Tay Sachs baby will die before the lawsuit
is resolved, or the Down's baby will be raised in an institution
because of his severe mental and physical handicaps. Family
relationships can sometimes best be preserved when the family
is given the financial support it so badly needs for the extraordinary expenses created by defendant's negligence.
Appropriatenessof Extraordinary
Damages in Wrongful Birth Cases
Finally, the standard damages rule that a tortfeasor is liable
for all damages does fit the circumstances in a wrongful birth
factual situation. In the Cockrum case, which involved a healthy
child in a wrongful pregnancy suit, the court noted that the
standard tort damges rule was "not suited for the circumstances
in this character of case." 146 Perhaps under different circumstances, such as those in a typical wrongful birth case, the rule
would be more appropriate. The injury to the parent bringing a
wrongful birth case is more apparent, and the courts are more
likely to recognize it. Once the injury is acknowledged, the damages flow as they would from any other tort.
The New Jersey courts appear unsure of whether the standard
tort damages rule applies in either wrongful birth or wrongful
pregnancy. They have held that: the standard damages rule
must be used, thus including the cost of rearing the healthy
child; 147 the standard damages rule cannot be used, thus precluding child-rearing costs; 48 and the standard damages rule
cannot be used for full damages with a handicapped child. 149
Without distinguishing between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth, courts and litigants are left unsure as to whether standard tort damages are available. The dangers of blurring the two
causes of action are demonstrated by these inconsistencies.

145. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846,849 (Tex. 1975).
146. 95 Ill. 2d at 203, 447 N.E.2d at 389.
147. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 75, 344 A.2d 436, 240 (1975).
148. P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 469, 432 A.2d 556, 560 (1981).
149. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 61, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981); Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDING DAMAGES IN
ILLINOIS WRONGFUL BIRTH CASES

Illinois would be well-advised to pattern its damages formula
after those jurisdictions which carefully distinguish between
wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth actions. Illinois should
also continue to allow juries to decide awards without limiting
wrongful birth awards to minimal damages. In addition, Illinois
should consider using a trust fund, as one federal court did, to
facilitate payments made for raising the handicapped child in a
wrongful birth suit.1 5 0 Finally, as an alternative to awarding

extraordinary damages to wrongful birth plaintiffs, Illinois could
modify the liberalty of the Wisconsin and Texas approaches by
using the benefits offset rule.
Awarding ExtraordinaryMedical and CaretakingExpenses
Illinois should follow the approach employed in Texas and
Wisconsin, which both distinguish between handicapped and
healthy children in their awards of damages. While limiting or
denying damages in wrongful pregnancy cases, which involve
healthy children,15 ' both Texas and Wisconsin award extraordinary damages in wrongful birth cases, which involve handi152
capped children.
In Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,' 53 a wrongful pregnancy
claim, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied all
damages to plaintiffs. 54 The parents had filed their claim after
a healthy boy was born following the doctor's failure to diagnose
a pregnancy during its early stages so that plaintiffs could
obtain an abortion.5 5 The Rieck court expressed many of the
same concerns as did the Cockrum court, including those regarding speculative damages, unreasonable burdens on defendants,
potential for fraudulent claims, and public policy questions. 56

150. The same, of course, might be done in a wrongful life count, such as in Goldberg,
Nos. 81-1450, 81-1962 (Il. App. Ct., argued Feb. 16,1983, Mar. 23,1983).
151. See infra notes 155-168 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. 64 Wis. 2d 514,219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
154. Id. at 519, 219 N.W.2d at 247. The extremely weak factual situation might
account for the court's refusal to award even birth related expenses, since the Cockrum
court did award such expenses where the factual setting was stronger.
155. Id.

156.

Id.
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One year later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,57 awarded extraordinary damages in an action for medical and hospital costs and expenses for
supportive care incurred as a result of a wrongful birth child's
deformities. The parents had filed a claim after defendants negligently diagnosed the mother's rubella as an allergic reaction.
Defendants did not know that the mother was pregnant at the
time the misdiagnosis was made. 15 8 The Dumer court carefully
distinguished Rieck, wherein the parents had "sought to recover
the entire expense of raising a normal, healthy but... unwanted
child during its dependency. Here the parents sue only for the
159
expense occasioned by the congenital defects."
Texas has given similar treatment to wrongful birth and
60 a wrongful
wrongful pregnancy cases. In Terrell v. Garcia,1
pregnancy action, the Texas Supreme Court refused to award the
plaintiff-parent any damages for child-rearing expenses,1 6' which
were the only damages sought. The parents filed suit after a
healthy child was born subsequent to an unsuccessful sterilization operation on the mother.' 62 The court held as a matter of
law that the healthy child was a benefit to the parents. 16 3
One year later, the Texas Supreme Court, in Jacobs v.
Theimer, 64 a wrongful birth case, held that a parent could recover extraordinary damages. 65 The court stated that there was
a significant distinction between Terrell and Jacobs, where the
plaintiff sought damages solely related to the child's physical
defects. 166 "No public policy obstacle should be interposed to
67
that recovery."'
The Illinois Supreme Court has already signalled a willingness to follow the paths of Texas and Wisconsin and allow
extraordinary damages in wrorigful birth cases. In Cockrum, the
Illiriois Supreme Court relied heavily on both the Texas and

157. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
158. Id. at 769, 233 N.W.2d at 373.
159. Id. at 775, 233 N.W.2d at 376.
160. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
161. Note that the plaintiffs did not seek pregnancy-related expenses, as in Cockrurn.
Plaintiffs in Terrell waived all damages, seeking child rearing expenses only. Id. at 126.
162. 496 S.W.2d at 126.
163. Id. at 128.
164. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
165. Id. at 848.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Wisconsin wrongful pregnancy cases, citing both Terrell6 8s and
Reick extensively. 16 9 In addition, at the time Cockrum was decided, the Texas and Wisconsin wrongful birth cases had already
been decided, yet Cockrum never referred to those cases.
Critics of the Texas-Wisconsin approach to wrongful birth
actions argue that such awards might possibly overburden defend170 Furants with lifelong financial responsibility to plaintiffs.
thermore, one commentator has noted that giving extraordinary
expenses to handicapped children and nothing to healthy children seems to treat the healthy life as being worthwhile, while
refusing to extend the same presumption to handicapped children. 171 Neither of these arguments, however, is compelling.
Extraordinary damages are much less than the full measure of
damages that would be provided under a standard tort damages rule.172
The plaintiffs are appropriately awarded more damages than
wrongful pregnancy claimants because the plaintiffs in a case
involving a handicapped child have suffered a more serious
injury. The defendant is not normally overburdened, nor do the
plaintiffs receive a windfall.
In addition, most courts which have recognized a distinction
between handicapped and healthy children, i.e., between wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy causes of action, also recognize the need for a different award of damages in each type of
case. As this area of torts becomes more defined, the tendency to
simply lump all of the cases together must end.
Guidelines for Illinois Juries
in Wrongful Birth and Wrongful PregnancyCases
Typically, Illinois courts have allowed juries to address complicated questions regarding tort damages awards. 173 Consistent
with this policy, the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions allow the
jury to consider such difficult questions as the nature, extent,

168. 95 Ill. 2d at 197, 200, 447 N.E.2d at 389, 390.
169. Id. at 197, 198,447 N.E.2d at 388,391.
170. Capron, supra note 5.
171. Id. at 636.
172. See supra text accompanying note 22-23.
173. See, e.g., Renslow, 67 M1.2d at 348, 367 N.E.2d at 1250; Arnold v. May Builders v.
Bruketta, 100 Ill. App. 3d 722, 426 N.E.2d 1246 (1981); Elberts v. Nussbaum Trucking Ins.,
9 Ill. App. 3d 381,422 N.E.2d 1040 (1981); Eckdahl v. Lease-A-Plane Int'l Licensing Corp.,
69 Ill. App. 3d 864, 388 N.E.2d 62 (1979).
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and duration of the injury. 1 74 With or without the benefit offset

rule, the jury should be allowed to take the handicapped/healthy
distinction into account. In his dissenting opinion in Cockrum,
Justice Clark offered detailed reasoning for allowing the jury to
make the distinction between healthy and handicapped children, 175 including the high probability that a jury would probably not award much, if anything, when the child is healthy. Justice Clark argued strongly that a jury will usually award damages
if the parent's distress is readily believable as the foreseeable
result of the doctor's negligence, and, if not, damages may not be
awarded. The difference is in the difficulty of proof. "It is not our
role to say to a litigant that because her damages may be difficult to prove, she may not even try to prove them. We should
rather trust the jury, here as we do in other cases, to appraise the
6
worth of the evidence presented to it."7

A Trust Fund for the HandicappedChild
As an approach to damages in wrongful birth cases, Illinois
courts should consider the use of a trust fund. In Robak v.
United States, 77 a Seventh Circuit decision brought under diversity jurisdiction and interpreting Alabama law, wrongful birth
plaintiffs were awarded $900,000 in full damages. 78 In part
because of the tremendous amount of money involved, the reviewing court approved the district court's unique approach of setting
up a reversionary trust fund for the handicapped child. 7 9 The
parents would draw money out of the trust as needed for the
child. If the child died, any remaining funds would be returned

174. ILLINOIS PAITERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) Nos. 30.01-30.09 (2d ed. 1971). See
also Graham, PatternJury Instructions: The Prospectof Over or Undercompensationin

Damage Awards for PersonalInjuries,28 DE PAUL L REv. 33 (1978).
For a jury instruction in a wrongful pregnancy case using the benefits offset rule, see
Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 262 n.3, 445 A.2d 873, 884 n.3 (1982).
175. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d at 209, 447 N.E.2d at 393 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
176. Id.
177.

658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law).

178. Robak was the first wrongful birth or wrongful pregnancy case heard by a federal court of appeal. The $900,000 full damages awarded included $30,000 for past
expenses, $229,800 for residential education and care to age 21, $515,000 for a qualified
companion for the remainder of the adult life, and $200,000 for the cost of maintaining
her for her adult life. See also Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
179. 658 F.2d at 479-80. For a wrongful pregnancy case using a trust fund, see Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47,300 N.W.2d 727 (1980).
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to the defendant. 80 The court noted that the case was governed
by ordinary tort principles. 181 The court reasoned that full damages should be awarded since the parents could have aborted the
child if they had known of her serious handicaps. The court thus
held that damages must include the cost of raising a normal
child, because the plaintiffs would not have had to bear that
82
expense but for the defendant's negligence.1
The Benefits Offset Rule
The benefits offset rule, found in section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 83 is another option available to Illinois
courts in wrongful birth cases. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court has rejected the use of this rule in wrongful pregnancy
cases involving healthy children, it might find the rule appropriate in wrongful birth cases involving handicapped children.
This might be especially true if Illinois decides to follow the pattern of Texas and Wisconsin of allowing extraordinary damages
in cases involving handicapped children.
The major advantage of using this rule is its flexibility, since
the jury is allowed to consider many factors. 8 4 Section 920 bal185
ances the injuries against the benefits a plaintiff receives.
Moreover, a comment to section 920 requires that the injury and
benefit involve the same interest. 186 Although the appellate decision in Cockrum focused on the "same interest harmed" require7
ment, the Illinois Supreme Court did not address this point.8

180. 658 F.2d at 479-80.
181. Id. at 478.
182. Id. at 479.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 920 (1965).
184. See supra note 42.
185. One court noted that in a wrongful pregnancy case, the rule gives "weight and
consideration in each case to the plaintiffs reasons for submitting to sterilization procedures. Such evidence is perhaps the most relevant information on the question of whether
the subsequent birth of a child actually constitutes damage to the parents." University of
Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 585, 667 P.2d 1294, 1300 (1983)
(citing Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1553 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1971). See supra note 39.
187. 99 111. App. 3d at 273,425 N.E.2d at 970. Cf. Cockrum, 95 Ill. 2d at 209, 447 N.E.2d
at 393 (Clark, J., dissenting), wherein the use of the benefits offset rule is supported: "I do
not believe that the many benefits of having a child should be excluded as a matter of
law; nor do I feel that such benefits can be held to automatically offset all expenses." For
a strong criticism of the Illinois Appellate Court majority opinion in Cockrum, which
attempts to explain its strict application of section 920, see Comment, supra note 10, at
133-34:
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Other courts and commentators have also noted this essential
requirement of the Restatement rule. 188 Some courts, however,
have criticized the strict application of section 920, finding that
the economic and emotional interests involved in rearing an
unexpected child are inextricably related.18 9 Furthermore, the
rule itself is based on a concept of unjust enrichment and "strict
interpretation of the same interest limitation would result in
unjust enrichment in wrongful pregnancy cases."' 190
CONCLUSION

Illinois courts facing the problem of determining damages in
wrongful birth cases involving handicapped children must recognize the distinction between the wrongful birth and wrongful
pregnancy causes of action. Each action has different factual
settings and different injuries, and thus each should apply a different analysis, resulting in the use of different damage formulas
for distinct causes of action. In wrongful birth cases involving
handicapped children, Illinois should follow the leads of Texas
and Wisconsin. Those states deny general damages and allow
recovery for extraordinary medical and caretaking expenses incurred as a result of the child's handicap. These extraordinary
expenses are not speculative, and will benefit the child, avoid
any undue burden on the defendant, create little or no potential
for fraudulent claims, and support Illinois public policies. The
extraordinary expenses damages formula adequately and justly

This explanation is inadequate. A plaintiffs financial and emotional interests
work together to support his overall level of satisfaction. Rigid categorization of
interests is unnecessary and especially inappropriate in the wrongful birth context in which plaintiffs' reasons for limiting family size are often multifaceted
and complex.

Id.
188. Note one commentator's caution against using non-economic benefits to offset
economic injuries: "[N]o amount of emotional pleasure will enable family to meet the
financial burdens of raising a child." Kashi, supra note 39, at 1431. The author analogized to domestic relations cases, stating that "surely no one would suggest that an
award of child support in a domestic relations case should be reduced in accordance with
the custodial parent's love for the child." Id.
189. University of Ariz., 136 Ariz. at 581, 677 P.2d at 1300 (citing Boone v. Mullendore,
415 So. 2d 718, 726 (Ala. 1982) (Faulkner, J., specially concurring)).
190. Id. For further criticism of section 920, see Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 428 A.2d
1366, 1380 (Pa. Super. 1981), vacated, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982) (Hester, J., concurring and dissenting) ("a rule of mitigation based upon conjecture and sheer guesswork");
Mason, 428 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Price, J., dissenting) ("subject completely to the whim, pre-

judices, and speculations of the fact-finder").
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compensates the injured parties, while preventing a windfall to
plaintiffs.
Illinois should also permit juries to handle the complicated
damages questions of wrongful birth cases. In addition, Illinois
should consider using a trust fund approach to the damages
problem. Finally, Illinois courts should reconsider use of the
benefits offset rule. Adopting these recommendations will help
Illinois face the difficult goal of balancing the demands of public
policy, the rights of injured plaintiffs, and the need to avoid placing undue burden on negligent defendants. It is only through a
careful analysis of the actual injuries involved in wrongful birth
actions that Illinois courts can achieve this goal. 19 1
REGINA GOULDING PAUL

191. Immediately prior to publication of this issue, the Illinois Appellate Court, in
Goldberg v. Ruskin, Nos. 81-1450, 81-1962, slip. op. (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 12, 1984), allowed
the parents of an impaired child to maintain a cause of action in tort for wrongful birth,

permitting the recovery of medical and other expenses reasonably necessary for the care
and treatment of the child's physical impairment. The court did not find such extraordinary expenses too speculative, referring to such damages as "certain and readily ascertainable." Id. slip op. at 14. The defendants' liability was predicated on their duty to warn
the parents of the potential impairment of their child, thereby giving the parents the
opportunity to consider an abortion.
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DAMAGES FORMULAS'
State

Wrongful Birth

Full

Ala.

4,5

Wrongful Pregnancy

Wrongful Life

No C/A

Pregnancy

6
9

10
13

7

Ariz.

8

Offset

Ark.

"

Pregnancy

12

Cal.

Extraord. Exp. ,"

Offset

15

Conn.

17

Offset

18

19

Del.

20

Pregnancy

21

22

D.C.

23

Offset

24

25

Pregnancy

27

Fla.

2

Extraord. Exp. 26

Extraord. Exp. 16

No C/A

28

No C/A

31

Ga.

29

Pregnancy 4,30

Ill.

32

Pregnancy 33

34

Ky.

35

Pregnancy

36

37

38

Offset

39

Minn.

41

Offset

42

Mo.

44

Pregnancy

45

N.H.

47

Pregnancy

48

:

Mich.

Offset

No C/A

40
43

No C/A

46

49

N.J.

3

Extraord. Exp. 50

Pregnancy 5,

No C/A

52

N.Y.

2

Extraord. Exp. 53

Pregnancy

54

No C/A

55

56

Full

57

Offset

59

Pregnancy

60

No C/A

61

Offset

62

63

No C/A

64

66

No C/A

67

Ohio
Pa.

3

S.C.

Extraord. Exp. 65

Pregnancy

Va.

Full

No C/A

Wash.

Extraord. Exp. 71

Wis.

Extraord. Exp. 74

Tex.

2

2

68

W.V.

77

Wyo.

80

No C/A

58

4,69

70

72

Extraord. Exp. 73

75

No C/A

79

78

Pregnancy 81

76

No C/A

82

(continued)
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Key:
"Full" - All damages awarded, including child-rearing expenses, with no benefits offset.
"Extraordinary Expenses" - Medical and caretaking expenses, i.e., child-rearing
expenses minus the costs of raising a healthy child. This may or may not include emotional damages, depending on the jurisdiction.
"No C/A" - No cause of action.
"Offset" - RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 920, the benefits rule. All damages
awarded, including child-rearing expenses, with an offset for all benefits.
"Pregnancy" - Damages limited to costs of pregnancy and childbirth.
1. This table represents the most recent holding in each jurisdiction. It does not depict
the complete history of the various holdings reached in each jurisdiction.
2. These jurisdictions indicate a willingness to distinguish between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth.
3. These jurisdictions refuse to distinguish between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful
birth.
4. Federal court sitting in diversity.
Alabama:
5. Robak v. U.S., 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (construing Alabama law) (wrongful
birth; full damages, no deduction for a healthy child's rearing).
6. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancyrelated damages).
7. Elliot v. Brown, 316 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (no cause of action for wrongful life).
Arizona:
8. No wrongful birth case. But see University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (wrongful pregnancy; offset rule; court indicated that it would recognize and distinguish a wrongful birth cause of action).
9. Id. (wrongful pregnancy; benefits offset rule).
10. No wrongful life cases.
Arkansas:
11. No wrongful birth case. But see Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239,628 S.W.2d 568 (1982)
(indicates that the court might recognize a wrongful birth cause of action).
12. Id. (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related damages, per dicta, although request
for those damages was deleted by plaintiff).
13. No wrongful life cases.
California:
14. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (wrongful
birth; extraordinary medical expenses).
15. Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982) (wrongful pregnancy; offset); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 598, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (wrongful
pregnancy; offset).
16. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (wrongful
life; extraordinary expenses). Because California was the first state to recognize wrongful
life, a great deal of attention has been paid to the California cases. Unfortunately, an
analysis of those cases is beyond the scope of this note.
Connecticut:
17. No wrongful birth case.
18. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982) (wrongful pregnancy; offset);
Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (wrongful pregnancy;

offset).
19.

No wrongful life cases.
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Delaware:
20. No wrongful birth cases.
21. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
22. No wrongful life cases.
23. No wrongful birth cases.
Districtof Columbia:
24. Stewart v. Bepko, Civ. No 81:2501, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy; statute of limitations had run, but court indicated that it might distinguish a
wrongful birth cause of action, because the injury arises at a different time); Hartke, v.
McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related damages). The Hartke court discussed various ways of using the benefits offset rule, indicating that it would always award at least pregnancy-related damages. This court gives the
jury a great deal of room to decide, depending on the reason for the sterilization.
25. No wrongful life cases.
Florida:
26. DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (wrongful birth;
extraordinary expenses); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(wrongful birth; extraordinary expenses minus pregnancy-related expenses, minus emotional damages, minus healthy child-rearing expenses).
27. Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 450 So. 2d 822
(Fla. 1984) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related expenses if healthy; extraordinary
and pregnancy-related expenses if handicapped). Note that this is an unusual approach,
probably because the facts of the case were so unusual; after a negligently preformed
vasectomy, a child with foreseeable handicap was born; then, after a negligently performed sperm count test, a healthy child was born. See also Public Health Trust v.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related
expenses).
28. Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (no cause of action for
wrongful life).
Georgia:
29. No wrongful birth cases.
30. White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981) (construing Georgia law)
(wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related expenses).
31. Id. (no wrongful life cause of action exists).
Illinois:
32. No wrongful birth cases.
33. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (wrongful
pregnancy; pregnancy-related expenses allowed).
34. No wrongful life cases.
Kentucky:
35. No wrongful birth cases.
36. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy; approves Maggard, but defers some questions to legislature; holding unclear); Maggard v.
McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related
expenses).
37. No wrongful life cases.
Michigan:
38. Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981) (wrongful
birth; offset, or possibility of extraordinary medical expenses; holding not clear).
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39. Claphan v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980) (wrongful pregnancy; full damages, no offset, but probably only because the defendant did not raise
offset on appeal); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978) (wrongful pregnancy; offset); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265
N.W.2d 411 (1978) (wrongful pregnancy; offset; court also allowed emotional damages in
this contracts malpractice case); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971) (wrongful pregnancy; offset).
40. Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 831,325 N.W.2d 600(1982) (no wrongful life cause of action exists); Strohmaier v. Association in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 122
Mich. App. 116, 332 N.W.2d 432 (1982) (no wrongful life cause of action exists).
Minnesota:
41. No wrongful birth cases.
42. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (wrongful pregnancy;
offset). In referring to the Texas and Wisconsin courts' distinction between wrongful
birth and wrongful pregnancy, the Minnesota court indicated that it might not be willing
to make such a distinction. Id. at 174 n.5.
43. No wrongful life cases.
Missouri:
44. No wrongful birth cases.
45. Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. App. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy;
pregnancy-related expenses); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. App. 1982) (wrongful
pregnancy; statute of limitations had run).
46. Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. App. 1982) (no wrongful life cause of action
exists).
New Hampshire:
47. No wrongful birth cases.
48. Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982) (wrongful pregnancy;
pregnancy-related expenses; court expressly stated that it might distinguish wrongful
birth.
49. No wrongful life cases.
New Jersey:
50. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (wrongful birth; extraordinary
expenses); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (wrongful birth; no childrearing or medical expenses; emotional injuries only); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967) (wrongful birth; no wrongful birth cause of action exists); Comras v.
Lewin, 183 N.J. Super. 42, 443 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1982) (wrongful birth; did not discuss
damages).
51. P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 1981) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related expenses); J.P.M. v. Schmid Laboratories, 178 N.J. Super. 122,
428 A.2d 515 (App. Div. 1981) (wrongful pregnancy; no damages; relies on Berman, and
no emotional damages were requested); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d
336 (Law Div. 1975) (wrongful pregnancy; offset).
52. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (no wrongful life cause of action
exists).
New York:
53. New York has had many cases brought under wrongful birth, wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful life causes of action. Only cases decided under the current state of
the law are cited herein. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (wrongful birth; extraordinary expenses, but no emotional damages).
54. Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1982) (wrongful pregnancy;
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pregnancy-related expenses; contract/malpractice action); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180,
434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancy-related expenses).
5§. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (no
wrongful life cause of action exists).
Ohio
56. No wrongful birth cases.
57. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (wrongful pregnancy;
full damages). This was an unusual case, because one twin was born healthy, and one
twin was born with an unforeseeable handicap. The court noted that the issue of whether
damages should be limited to pregnancy-related expenses was not raised on appeal. Id. at
498 n.1.
58. No wrongful life cases.
Pennsylvania:
59. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(wrongful birth; medical expenses only; no other damages sought).
60. Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982) (wrongful pregnancy, offset rule); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (wrongful pregnancy; offset rule). Speck was an unusual case, because the child was born with foreseeable handicap after an unsuccessful vasectomy and an unsuccessful abortion. See also
Stribling v. DeQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d 239 (1980) (wrongful pregnancy;
pregnancy-related expenses).
61. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (wrongful life cause of action
does not exist).
South Carolina:
62. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980) (wrongful birth; in dicta,
the court indicated that it would use offset rule, as in any traditional tort claim). Phillips
focused primarily on recognizing the cause of action for wrongful birth, and denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
63. Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602 (1976) (wrongful pregnancy; no
opinion regarding damages). Baldwin affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a
demurrer.
64. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980) (wrongful life; no cause of
action exists).
Texas:
65. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (wrongful birth; extraordinary
expenses only; emotional damages excluded; no other damages requested); Nelson v.
Drusen, 635 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, No. C-1249, slip op. (Tex. Nov. 16, 1983)
(wrongful birth, statute of limitations had run; case dismissed).
66. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974) (wrongful pregnancy; plaintiff waived pregnancy-related damages, although the
court indicated that it would allow these expenses; no child-rearing expenses allowed).
67. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (wrongful life cause of action does
not exist).
Virginia:
68. Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982) (wrongful birth, full damages). The Naccash court made no mention of reducing this award by the costs of raising
a healthy child. The court included emotional damages, but excluded funeral expenses. In
addition, the court noted that those expenses would be limited, since a Tay Sachs baby
will normally die within a few years. The court also noted, however, that an extended
handicapped life might be handled differently.
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69. McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1982) (construing Virginia law)
(wrongful pregnancy; no cause of action exists).
70. No wrongful life cause of action exists.
Washington:
71. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (wrongful
birth; extraordinary medical expenses and emotional damages, minus cost of raising
healthy child). The court indicated that it would distinguish wrongful birth and wrongful
pregnancy.
72. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (wrongful pregnancy; case
dismissed because the parents failed to prove liability; jury found no proximate cause).
73. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (wrongful life
cause of action recognized; a plaintiff may recover extraordinary expenses, but cannot
duplicate parents' award).
Wisconsin:
74. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (wrongful
birth; extraordinary expenses minus costs of raising a healthy child).
75. Reick v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (wrongful
pregnancy; no cause of action exists).
76. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (no wrongful
life cause of action exists).
West
77.
78.
79.

Virginia:
No wrongful birth cases.
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (wrongful pregnancy).
No wrongful life cases.

Wyoming:
80. No wrongful birth cases.
81. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982) (wrongful pregnancy; pregnancyrelated expenses).
82. Id. (no wrongful life cause of action exists).

